It is assumed that players bundle nodes in which other players must move into analogy classes, and players only have expectations about the average behavior in every class. A solution concept is proposed for multi-stage games with perfect information: at every node players choose best-responses to their analogy-based expectations, and expectations are correct on average over those various nodes pooled together into the same analogy classes. The approach is applied to a variety of games. It is shown that a player may beneÞt from having a coarse analogy partitioning. And for simple analogy partitioning,
Introduction
Received game theory assumes that players are perfectly rational both in their ability to form correct expectations about other players' behavior and in their ability to select best-responses to their expectations.
The game of chess is a striking example in which the standard approach is inappropriate.
In chess, it is clearly impossible to know (learn) what the opponent might do for every board position.
In this paper, we investigate situations in which players form their expectations about others' behavior by analogy between several contingencies as opposed to for every single contingency in which each of these other players must move. 1 More precisely, each player i bundles nodes at which players other than i must move -a bundle is called an analogy class.
And player i only forms expectations about the average behavior in each analogy class that he considers.
In other words, player i is viewed here as simplifying what he wants to know (learn) about others' behavior: 2 Player i categorizes nodes in which other players must move into analogy classes. And only the average behavior in each analogy class is being considered by player i.
We use the word 'analogy' because in two nodes belonging to a same class, the expectation formed by the player is the same. Besides, the equilibrium expectation in an analogy class will be assumed to coincide with the effective average behavior in the class. Accordingly, nodes which are visited more often will contribute more to the expectation, and the behaviors in those nodes will contaminate the expectation used in all nodes of the analogy class (no matter how often they are visited). The extrapolation (here of the expectation) from more visited to less visited contingencies is -we believe -a key feature of the analogy idea. 3 The aim of this paper is twofold. The Þrst objective is to propose a solution concept to describe the interaction of players forming their expectations by analogy. This will be called the analogy-based expectation equilibrium. The second objective is to analyze the properties of analogy-based expectation equilibria in various strategic interaction contexts.
The games we consider are multi-stage games with almost perfect information and perfect recall. That is, simultaneous moves and moves by Nature are allowed. But, in any stage, all previous moves are assumed to be known to every player. 4 Clearly, this is not so if this player plays against Nature or if other players have a dominant strategy. Then a coarse partitioning has the sole effect of making this player 's choice of strategy possibly suboptimal without affecting the behaviors of others. But, otherwise, a coarse partitioning of, say, player i may well induce (in equilibrium) a change of strategies of players other than i (as a response to a change of strategy of player i). When such a change of strategies is good for player i, player i may in equilibrium end up with a strictly higher payoff.
We next apply the analogy-based expectation approach to the so called Þnite horizon paradoxes. For simple analogy partitioning, we show both in the centipede game and in the Þnitely repeated prisoner's dilemma that there may be equilibria in which there is a fair amount of cooperation throughout the game except possibly toward reaching the end of the game at which time some opportunistic behavior may occur.
To illustrate the claim, consider a variant of the Þnitely repeated prisoner's dilemma in which there are many periods, there is no discounting and the exact values of the stage game prisoner's dilemma payoffs are independently drawn from period to period according to some pre-speciÞed distribution (with Þnite support). And assume that both players categorize histories into two analogy classes according to whether or not some opportunistic behavior was previously observed (within the game).
Playing cooperatively most of the time except if some opportunistic behavior previously occurred or toward the end of the game (if the immediate gain from switching to an opportunistic behavior is sufficiently high) is part of an analogy-based expectation equilibrium.
To see this, consider the expectations induced by the behaviors just described. Each player should expect the other player (1) to play opportunistically whenever some opportunistic behavior previously occurred and (2) to play cooperatively (on average) with a large probability otherwise (if the number of repetitions is large). Given such expectations, playing opportunistically is optimal whenever some opportunistic behavior previously occurred.
And, when no opportunistic behavior previously occurred, playing cooperatively in all but a few periods toward the end is also optimal because players perceive that by playing opportunistically they will trigger a non-cooperative phase whereas by playing cooperatively they expect the other player to continue playing cooperatively with a large probability.
The key reason why the logic of backward induction fails here is that players do not perceive exactly when the other player will start having an opportunistic behavior. As a result of this fuzzy perception (which is due to their analogy partitioning), players play cooperatively most of the time because on average it is true that by playing cooperatively the other player keeps playing cooperatively with a large probability.
It should be noted that players do consider playing opportunistically toward reaching the end of the game, even if no opportunistic behavior previously occurred. This is so whenever the immediate gain from playing opportunistically offsets the cost of triggering a non-cooperative phase till the end of the game (as opposed to maintaining the cooperative phase). In this sense, players do perceive the time structure of the interaction even though they do not perceive the exact time structure of the strategy employed by their opponent. 9 We also brießy consider the inÞnitely repeated prisoner's dilemma. We observe that strategy proÞles in which some deviations are not punished can be sustained with the analogybased expectation approach. The point is that, while such a deviation would be proÞtable, it need not perceived as such if the corresponding node is bundled with nodes in which there would be an effective punishment. As a result (of such an analogy partitioning), the involved player perceives an average punishment, which deters him from deviating. Thus, in repeated games, the analogy-based approach permits less systematic punishments than the standard approach does.
Our next application deals with ultimatum and bargaining games. Suppose that players can make any possible offer, but that they have expectations about the acceptance probability only according to whether the offer is above or below a threshold (i.e., whether or not their offer is generous). We show that (1) the responder in a take-it-or-leave-it offer game may get a payoff that lies strictly above his reservation utility (i.e. his payoff from refusing any agreement), (2) there may be no immediate agreement in a (complete information) bargaining game in which players alternate making offers.
The effect of analogy reasoning here is to reduce the set of offers that players consider in equilibrium. If a player makes a generous offer, he will always consider the least generous offers among these. This is because (due to his analogy partitioning) he has the same (acceptance) expectation for all such offers, and the least generous offer among these is clearly the one he likes best given such an expectation. The analysis of ultimatum and bargaining games follows.
In the last part of the paper, we provide some general discussion. We Þrst differentiate the analogy-based expectation equilibrium from other solution concepts, in particular related to the idea of imperfect recall (and of imperfect information). 10 Second, we suggest two principles that may help structure analogy partitioning. The Þrst principle applies to those games in which all players must move in the same nodes, and we consider the extra requirement that a player should himself behave in the same way in all nodes associated with the same 9 The analogy approach thus permits an endogenous treatment of the end effect identiÞed in experiments (see Selten-Stocker 1986) . 10 An alternative interpretation for the concept is also proposed and discussed.
analogy class. The second principle is that all analogy classes considered by every player should be reached with positive probability along the played path. For both principles, we provide examples in which the prediction of the analogy-based approach is in sharp contrast with the conventional approach. We also analyze the issue of multiplicity of equilibria, and we discuss some of the related literature on bounded rationality.
A general framework 2.1 The class of games
We consider multi-stage games with almost perfect information and perfect recall. That is, in each stage every player knows all the actions that were taken at any previous stage (including those exogenous events determined by Nature at any previous stage), and no information set contained in the current stage provides any knowledge of play in that stage. 11
In the main part of the paper, we will restrict attention to games with a Þnite number of stages such that, at every stage and for every player (including Nature), the set of pure actions is Þnite. This class of (Þnite) multi-stage games with almost perfect information is referred to as Γ. 12 The standard representation of an extensive form game in class Γ includes the set of players i = 1, ...n denoted by N, the game tree Υ (specifying who moves when and over which space, including the exogenous events chosen by Nature), and the preferences % i of every player i over outcomes in the game.
A node in the game tree Υ will be denoted by h; it contains information about all the actions, including those by Nature, that were taken at any stage prior to node h. The set of nodes h will be denoted by H. The set of nodes at which player i must move will be denoted by H i . For every node h ∈ H i , we let A i (h) denote player i's action space at node h.
Remark:
When interpreting experiments, it may be meaningful to view the players as being engaged in a variety of games as opposed to only one game. 13 One can represent this as a metagame made of an extra move by Nature in stage 0 which would determine the effective game to be played (according to the frequency with which each (original) game was played).
11 Also, simultaneous moves are allowed, but each player moves at most once within a given stage. 12 In some applications, we will consider inÞnite action spaces and/or inÞnitely many stages. The solution concept will easily generalize to these applications. 13 For example, bargaining and ultimatum games or centipede games of various lengths...
Classes of analogy:
Each player i forms an expectation about the behavior of other players j, j 6 = i. However, player i does not form an expectation about every player j's behavior in every contingency h ∈ H j in which player j must move. He pools together several contingencies in which other players must move, and he forms an expectation about the average behavior in these pooled contingencies. Such a pool is referred to as a class of analogy.
Formally, each player i partitions the set {(j, h) ∈ N × H j , j 6 = i} into subsets α i referred to as analogy classes. 14 The collection of player i's analogy classes α i is referred to as player i's analogy partition, and it is denoted by An i . When (j, h) and (j 0 , h 0 ) are in the same analogy class α i , we require that A j (h) = A j 0 (h 0 ). That is, in two contingencies (j, h) and (j 0 , h 0 ) that player i treats by analogy, the action space of the involved player(s) should be the same. 15 The common action space in the analogy class α i will be denoted by A(α i ). The proÞle of analogy partitions (An i ) i∈N will be denoted by An.
Remark: At Þrst glance, there is some resemblance between an analogy class and an information set in an extensive form game with incomplete information. However, note that
An i refers to a partitioning of the nodes where players other than i must move (as opposed to a partitioning of the nodes where player i himself must move as in the notion of player i's information set). 16 
Strategic environment:
A strategic environment in our setup not only speciÞes the set of players N, the game tree Υ and players' preferences % i . It also speciÞes how the various players partition the set of nodes at which other players must move into classes of analogy, which is summarized in An. A strategic environment is thus formally given by (N, Υ, % i , An).
Concepts
Analogy-based expectations:
An analogy-based expectation for player i is denoted by β i . It speciÞes for every player i's analogy class α i , a probability measure over the action space A(α i ). This probability measure is denoted by β i (α i ), and β i (α i ) should be interpreted as player i's expectation about the 14 A partition of a set X is a collection of subsets xk ⊆ X such that S k xk = X and xk ∩ x k 0 = ∅ for k 6 = k 0 .
15 More generally, we could allow the players to relabel the original actions of the various players as they wish. From that prespective, A j (h) should only be required to be in bijection with A j 0 (h 0 ) (as opposed to being equal). Describing this and the subsequent notion of consistency would require heavy notations without adding anything to the concept. It is therefore ignored for expositional reasons. 16 We will offer more discussion throughout the paper on the relationship between analogy reasoning and incomplete information (and imperfect recall) in extensive form games.
average behavior in class α i .
Remark:
Note again the different nature of β i (·) and of player i's belief system in extensive form games with incomplete information. Here β i (α i ) is an expectation (or belief) about the average behavior of players other than i in class α i . (It is not a belief, say, about the likelihood of the various elements (j, h) pooled in α i .)
Strategy:
A behavior strategy for player i is a mapping that assigns to each node h ∈ H i at which player i must move a distribution over player i's action space at that node. 17 Formally, a behavior strategy for player i is denoted by σ i . It speciÞes for every h ∈ H i a distribution -denoted σ i (h) ∈ ∆A i (h) -according to which player i selects actions in A i (h) when at node h. We also let σ −i denote the strategy proÞle of players other than i, and we let σ denote the strategy proÞle of all players.
Sequential rationality:
The criterion used by the players to choose their strategies given their analogy-based expectations is as follows. Given his analogy-based expectation β i , player i constructs a strategy proÞle for players other than i that assigns player j to play according to β i (α i ) at node h whenever (j, h) ∈ α i . (This is the most natural strategy proÞle compatible with player i's partial expectation β i . 18 ) And the criterion considered by player i is that of best-response against this induced strategy proÞle after every node where player i must move.
Formally, for every β i and j 6 = i, we deÞne the β i -perceived strategy of player j, σ
Given player i's strategy σ i and given node h, we let σ i | h denote the continuation strategy of player i induced by σ i from node h onwards. Similarly, we let σ −i | h and σ | h be the strategy proÞles induced by σ −i and σ, respectively, from node h onwards. We also let u h i (σ i | h , σ −i | h ) denote the expected payoff obtained by player i when the play has reached node h, and players behave according to the strategy proÞle σ. 20 17 Mixed strategies and behavior strategies are equivalent since we consider games of perfect recall. The behavior strategy formulation is better suited to deÞne the consistency condition (see below). 18 If for every h such that (j, h) ∈ α i , the behavior strategy of player j at node h is given by βi(α i ), then the average of these (whatever the weighting of the various elements of αi) must be βi(α i ). A richer setup would allow player i to consider any strategy proÞle for players other than i that is compatible with his partial knowledge βi (see Remark 2 after the deÞnition of analogy-based expectation equilibria). 19 This deÞnes a strategy for player j because all (j, h) where h ∈ H j belong to one and only one α i since the set of α i is a partition of {(j, h) ∈ N × H j , j 6 = i}. 20 These functions can formally be derived from %i and the distributions over outcomes induced by σ | h .
Definition 1 (Criterion) Player i's strategy σ i is a sequential best-response to the analogybased expectation β i if and only if for all strategies σ 0 i and all nodes h ∈ H i ,
Consistency:
In equilibrium, we require the analogy-based expectations of the players to be consistent.
That is, to correspond to the real average behavior in every considered class where the weight given to the various elements of an analogy class must itself be consistent with the real probabilities of visits of these various elements.
We think of the consistency requirement as resulting from a learning process in which players would eventually manage to have correct analogy-based expectations. In line with the literature on learning in games (see Fudenberg-Levine 1998), we distinguish according to whether or not consistency is also required for analogy classes that are reached with probability 0 in equilibrium. 21 To present formally the consistency idea, we denote by P σ (h) the probability that node h is reached according to the strategy proÞle σ. 
whenever P σ (h) > 0 for some h and j such that (j, h) ∈ α i .
This deÞnition deserves a few comments. The view is that each player i happens to make consistent (or correct) analogy-based expectations as a result of learning. Suppose players repeatedly act in the environment as described above. Suppose further that the true pattern of behavior adopted by the players is that described by the strategy proÞle σ. Consider player i who tries to forecast the average behavior in the analogy class α i , assumed to be reached with positive probability (according to σ).
The actual behavior in the analogy class α i is an average of what every player j actually does in each of the nodes h where (j, h) ∈ α i , that is, σ j (h). The correct weighting of σ j (h)
should coincide with the frequency with which node (j, h) is visited (according to σ) relative to 21 When it is required for unreached classes, the underlying learning model should involve some form of trembling (or exogenous experimentation). When it is not, trembles are not necessary.
other elements in α i . The correct weighting of σ j (h) should thus be
which in turn yields expression (1).
It should be noted that DeÞnition 2 places no restrictions on player i's expectations about those analogy classes that are not reached according to σ. The next deÞnition proposes a stronger notion of consistency (in the spirit of trembling hand or sequential equilibrium) that places restrictions also on those expectations.
Formally, we deÞne Σ 0 to be the set of totally mixed strategy proÞles, i.e. strategy proÞles σ such that for every player j, for every node h ∈ H j at which player j must move, any action a j in the action space A j (h) is played with strictly positive probability (thus implying that
For every strategy proÞle σ ∈ Σ 0 , all analogy classes are reached with positive probability.
Thus, there is a unique analogy-based expectation β i that is consistent with σ in the sense of satisfying condition (1) for all analogy classes α i . Denote this analogy-based expectation by β i hσi.
Definition 3 (Strong consistency) Player i's analogy-based expectation β i is strongly consistent with σ if and only if there exists a sequence of totally mixed strategy proÞles
converges to σ such that the sequence
converges to β i .
Solution concepts:
In equilibrium, we require that at every node players play best-responses to their analogybased expectations (sequential rationality) and that expectations are consistent. We deÞne two solution concepts according to whether or not consistency is imposed for analogy classes that are not reached along the played path. And we refer to a pair (σ, β) of strategy proÞle and analogy-based expectation proÞle as an assessment. 1. σ i is a sequential best-response to β i and 2. β i is strongly consistent with σ.
Remark 1: To the extent that the number of analogy classes α i considered by player i is small, player i has few features of the other players' behavior to learn, which makes the consistency requirement more plausible from a learning perspective than in the perfect rationality paradigm.
Remark 2: A priori there are strategies other than σ β i −i that could generate the analogybased expectation β i . 22 A more elaborate criterion than the one considered in DeÞnition 1 would view player i as playing a best-response against some strategy proÞle σ 0 −i compatible with β i but not necessarily σ β i −i . The corresponding solution concepts would be somewhat more complicated to present (but most of the insights developed below would continue to hold for such alternative speciÞcations).
Remark 3: We have assumed that player i's analogy classes are partitions of the nodes where players other than i must move. In some cases, it may be meaningful to allow players to predict the behavior of other players also based on their own behavior. There is no difficulty with allowing the analogy classes α i to also include nodes (i, h) such that at node h player i must choose an action in A(α i ) (the same action space as the one faced by the other players involved in α i ). However, it should be understood that the corresponding analogy-based expectation β i (α i ) is used by player i only to construct a strategy proÞle for players other than i (see DeÞnition 1). 23 Remark 4: The setup could easily be extended to cover the case where players have private information. However, this would signiÞcantly complicate the description of the setup. For expositional (rather than conceptual) reasons, we have chosen to focus on games with almost perfect information.
Preliminary results
We conclude this general presentation by making two simple observations. The Þrst one shows the relation to subgame perfection when all players use the Þnest partitioning as their analogy device. The second one shows the existence of analogy-based expectation equilibria in Þnite environments.
Formally, we say that all players use the Þnest analogy partitioning if there are no i, (j, h), (j 0 , h 0 ) 6 = (j, h) and α i ∈ An i such that (j, h) ∈ α i and (j 0 , h 0 ) ∈ α i . We have:
Proposition 1 Consider an environment (N, Υ, % i , An) in which all players use the Þnest 22 In general (except for σ β i −i ), to check that σ 0 −i generates βi it is indispensable to know the frequency of visits of every node h ∈ α i (as given by the candidate strategy proÞle σ). 23 We have chosen not to present the concept with that extension because it could create an extra source of confusion (with the notion of information set).
analogy partitioning. Then if (σ, β) is an analogy-based expectation equilibrium of (N, Υ, % i , An), σ is a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium of (N, Υ, % i ).
Proof. When players use the Þnest analogy partitioning, strong consistency of β with respect to σ implies that σ β i −i = σ −i . Proposition 1 then follows from DeÞnition 1. Remark: When at least one player, say player i, does not use the Þnest partition as his analogy device, the play of an analogy-based expectation equilibrium need not correspond to that of a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium. This is because in an analogy-based expectation equilibrium (σ, β), player i's strategy σ i is required to be a best-response to σ β i −i (after every node h). But, σ β i −i need not (in general) coincide with σ −i as in a Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium. This will be further illustrated throughout the paper.
Proposition 2 (Existence) Every Þnite environment (N, Υ, % i , An) has at least one analogybased expectation equilibrium.
Proof. The strategy of proof is the same as that for the existence proof of sequential equilibria . We mention the argument, but for space reasons we do not give the details of it.
First, assume that in every node h ∈ H i , player i must choose every action a i ∈ A i (h) with probability no smaller than ε (this is in spirit of Selten 1975 ). 24 It is clear than an analogybased expectation equilibrium with such additional constraints must exist. Call (σ ε , β ε ) one such proÞle of strategies and analogy-based expectations. By compactness properties (which hold in the Þnite environment case), some subsequence must be converging to say (σ, β), which is an analogy-based expectation equilibrium.
Various effects of analogy reasoning 3.1 Analogy reasoning can be good or bad
We wish to illustrate that bundling contingencies by analogy can either beneÞt or hurt a player. To this end, we consider the following environment. Two normal form games G and G 0 are being played in parallel. Game G is played with probability ν and game G 0 is played with probability 1 − ν. (In the formulation of Section 2, the game tree Υ consists of a Þrst move by Nature about the selection of the game -according to the probabilities ν and 1 − ν -then followed by the normal form game G or G 0 accordingly.) There are two players i = 1, 2 in G and G 0 . In both G and G 0 , player i must choose an action a i in the same Þnite action space A i .
In the game tree Υ, a node can be identiÞed with a normal form game G or G 0 . We assume that player 2 uses the Þnest partitioning (i.e., player 2 uses two analogy classes {(1, G)} and
We wish to compare the equilibrium payoff obtained by player 1 in each of the subgames G, G 0 according to whether player 1 uses the Þnest partitioning or the coarsest partitioning (in the latter case player 1 pools together the two subgames G and G 0 into a single class of
Claim 1: Suppose player 2 has a dominant strategy 25 in both games G and G 0 . Player 1's equilibrium payoff -in both G and G 0 -is no smaller when player 1 uses the Þnest partitioning as opposed to the coarsest partitioning.
Proof. Whatever the partitioning of player 1, player 2 will in equilibrium select his dominant strategy in both G and G 0 . The Þnest partitioning of player 1 allows player 1 to pick a bestresponse to player 2's dominant strategy in both G and G 0 , which is the highest payoff player 1 can hope to get (in both G and G 0 ) given player 2's behavior.
Within the context of Claim 1, it is immediate to construct an example in which player 1 's equilibrium payoff is strictly lower when he uses the coarse partitioning as opposed to the Þnest partitioning. (Such an example must be such that player 2 's dominant strategy is not the same in games G and G 0 , and thus player 1's analogy-based expectation is not accurate for games G and G 0 in isolation.)
When player 2 has no dominant strategy, however, analogy reasoning may beneÞt player 1, as the following example shows.
where in each cell the left and right numbers indicate players 1 and 2's payoffs, respectively.
Both games are assumed to be played with equal probability, i.e. ν = 1 2 . In both G and G 0 , the action space of players 1 and 2 are A 1 = {U, D} and A 2 = {L, M, R}, respectively.
The example is such that both G and G 0 have a unique Nash equilibrium, which is UR in game G and DR in game G 0 . Thus, when both players use the Þnest partitioning, player 1 gets a payoff of 2 in both subgames.
Suppose now that player 1 uses the coarsest partitioning (while player 2 uses the Þnest).
The following assessment is an analogy-based expectation equilibrium. 25 This dominant strategy need not be the same in both games G and G 0 . To check that the above assessment is an equilibrium, note that given the strategy proÞle, players' analogy-based expectations are consistent. Then given player 1's analogy-based
Finally, note that according to the above strategy proÞle player 1 gets a payoff of 3 in both G and G 0 , which is strictly larger than 2 -the equilibrium payoff obtained by player 1 when he uses the Þnest partitioning.
The key feature of Example 1 is that player 2 does not play in the same way when player 1 uses the Þnest partitioning and when he uses the coarsest partitioning. It is still the case that the coarseness of player 1's partitioning induces player 1 not to optimize against player 2's behavior in G and G 0 (because the best-response would be U (and not D) in game G and D (and not U) in game G 0 ). However, it allows player 1 to Þnd it optimal to play D (resp. U) in game G (resp. G 0 ), which in turn induces player 2 to play an action that is more favorable to player 1.
Remark 1: In the analogy-based expectation equilibrium shown in Example 1, both players 1 and 2 behave differently in games G and G 0 . Thus, even by varying the payoff matrix of games G and G 0 , it is not possible to interpret the equilibrium outcome as emerging from an imperfect information (of either player) as to which game (G or G 0 ) is being played.
Remark 2: In Example 1, when player 1 uses the coarsest partitioning, there is also an equilibrium in which UR is played in game G and DR is played in game G 0 as in the Þnest partitioning case. Modify the speciÞcation of game G so that player 2 has a dominant strategy which is to play L. It can be checked that when player 1 uses the coarsest partitioning the assessment shown in Example 1 is the only analogy-based expectation equilibrium in this modiÞed example. Thus, in this modiÞed setup, player 1 beneÞts from the coarse partitioning in subgame G 0 whatever the equilibrium under consideration.
Remark 3: If one insists on having equilibria that employ pure strategies, player 2 should have at least three actions for an example of the sort displayed in Example 1 to work.
Otherwise, similar conclusions can be derived with 2x2 games and mixed strategy equilibria.
Comment: In the above situation we have assumed that the same player 2 were to play in both games G and G 0 . Of course, an alternative interpretation is that the player other than 1 involved in game G is not the same as the one involved in game G 0 , say player 2 in game G and player 2 0 in game G 0 . The partitioning of player 1 considered above corresponds then to {(2, G), (2 0 , G 0 )}. For that interpretation, it is essential to allow player 1 to treat by analogy nodes in which several different players (here players 2 and 2 0 ) are involved.
Centipede game
Consider the centipede game CP K (Þrst introduced by Rosenthal 1982 ) and depicted in Figure 1 . designates the last node (i.e., period 2K) at which player 1 must move, N 
2 designates the last node (in period 2K − 1) at which player 2 must move, and
the Þrst node (in period 26 We implicitly assume in the following that the players label these actions the same way. 1 , the payoffs to players 1 and 2 are a 0 and b 0 , respectively. All a t and b t , t = 0, ...2K are assumed to be integers that satisfy for all k ≥ 1:
These conditions guarantee that (1) the unique Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE)
of CP K is such that player 2 Takes in the Þrst period (this follows from a 2k+1 > a 2k and
, and (2) in any period t ≤ 2K − 2, both players are better off if Take occurs two periods later, i.e. in period t + 2, than if it occurs in the current period t (this follows from
The prediction of the SPNE sounds relatively unintuitive, especially when the number of periods 2K is large (because then taking in the Þrst node seems to induce very severe losses for both players). As we now illustrate, the analogy approach explains why players may Pass most of the time in the centipede game, at least for long enough versions of the game.
In order to deal with the effect of increasing the number of periods in CP K , we will consider inÞnite sequences of integers (a k ) ∞ k=0 , (b k ) ∞ k=0 satisfying (2). We will also assume that the difference between two consecutive payoffs is uniformly bounded from above. That is, there exists ∆ > 0 such that for all t ≥ 0,
Regarding analogy partitioning, we will mostly consider the case in which both players use the coarsest partitions as their analogy device. That is, each player i is assumed to pool together all the nodes N (k) j at which player j, j 6 = i must move into a single class of analogy
The strategic environment is thus described by the set of players N = {1, 2}, the game tree CP K , players' preferences % i as deÞned by a t , b t , and the analogy partitioning structure An as described by α 1 and α 2 : (N, CP K , % i , An).
Player i's analogy-based expectation β i reduces here to a single probability measure
which stands for player i's expectation about the average behavior of player j throughout the game.
We Þrst consider assessments (σ, β) such that the strategy of every player is pure (i.e. for
And we consider the following condition:
Proposition 3 Suppose that condition (4) holds, and consider the environment (N, CP K % i , An). There are two possible equilibrium paths corresponding to self-conÞrming analogy-based expectation equilibria in pure strategies: Either player 2 Takes in the Þrst period or the game reaches period 2K in which player 1 Takes.
Proof. (a) We Þrst prove that the two mentioned outcomes can be obtained as analogy-based expectation equilibrium outcomes.
(i) Observe Þrst that the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium outcome corresponds to the analogy-based expectation equilibrium (σ, β) in which for i = 1, 2 , β i (α i ) = T ake and
Consider the strategy proÞle σ such that player 2 Passes always and player 1 Takes in the last period 2K.
To be consistent with σ, the analogy-based expectation of player 1 must be that player 2 Passes with probability 1, i.e. β 1 (α 1 ) = P ass (since player 2 Passes always when he has to move).
To be consistent with σ, the analogy-based expectation of player 2 must be that player 1 Passes with probability , then these are the only possible outcomes of self-conÞrming analogy-based expectation equilibria in pure strategies. (The point is that for a pure outcome other than that of the SPNE to emerge as a self-conÞrming analogy-based expectation equilibrium, it should be that λ 2 ≥ 1 2
. But, then the best-response of player 2 to β2(α2) = λ 2 P ass + (1 − λ 2 )T ake is to Pass always, thus leading to the wished conclusion.) 28 Take at the last node may then fail to be the outcome of an analogy-based expectation equilibrium in pure strategies. This is, for example, the case when
(because then player 2 would strictly prefer Taking in the last but one node rather than Passing always).
(2) Any self-conÞrming analogy-based expectation equilibrium of (N, CP K , % i , An) in which each player i Passes with probability 1 in the Þrst node N
Proof
Suppose that players 1 and 2 Pass with probability 1 in the Þrst node where they must move. The consistency condition implies that the analogy-based expectation of player i,
Together these two observations imply that the mapping
has a Þxed point such that λ i ≥ is that, by increasing the length of CP K , the length of the end phase -in which Take may occur -can never grow above some Þxed and bounded value. expecting player 2 to Take in α 1 ). And that there is another equilibrium in mixed strategies 29 Since all payoffs are integers satisfying (2), the differences a t − a t+2 , b t − b t+2 are no smaller than 2. 30 When condition (4) does not hold, this may involve an equilibrium in mixed strategies.
in which Take may occur in the Þrst two periods (it is such that each player i = 1, 2 plays in mixed strategies in N (K) i and Takes with probability 1 in all other nodes).
We now consider a slight modiÞcation of the environment in which the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium is no longer an equilibrium and Take can only occur toward the end of the game. SpeciÞcally, assume the players not only play game CP K , but also another game that is the same as game CP K except that there are only two moves corresponding to Player 1 passing or not to the middle of the game and Player 2 passing or not from the middle to the end of the game. Formally, let K be an odd number. Consider the game tree Υ such that in stage 0 Nature selects either game CP K with probability ν CP > 0 or game F with probability ν F > 0 where game F is described as follows.
Game F has the same two players i = 1, 2 as CP K and two moves. Player 2 moves in the Þrst node denoted by M 2 . At node M 2 , player 2 must choose an action in A 2 = {P ass, T ake}. Also, we assume that each player i uses a single class of analogy. That is,
and we call (N, Υ, % i , An) the associated environment.
Proposition 5 Suppose that conditions (2) and (3) hold. There exists an integer m such that for all K > m, all self-conÞrming analogy-based expectation equilibria (σ, β) of (N, Υ, % i , An)
are such that player i Passes with probability 1 in M i and in every N
Proof. In game F , whatever their analogy-based expectation, each player i chooses optimally to Pass. This ensures that the analogy-based expectation of player i, β i (α i ) = λ i .P ass + (1 − λ i ).T ake satisÞes λ i ≥ ν F > 0 for i = 1, 2. Given condition (3), this ensures that, for K large enough, the best-response in CP K of each player i is at least to Pass in the Þrst node where he must move, thus ensuring that λ i > 1 2 for i = 1, 2. We may then conclude using the best-response argument in the proof of Proposition 4.
In the above analysis of the centipede game CP K , we assumed that players use the coarsest analogy partitioning. However, the insight that analogy reasoning may lead players to Pass most of the time in long enough CP K would in general carry over, even when players use more than one analogy class.
Suppose, for example, that each player i considers two classes:
according to whether the end phase or the main phase of the game is being considered, and call (N, CP K , % i , An) the corresponding environment.
Proposition 6 There exist m and an analogy-based-expectation equilibrium of (N, CP K , % i
, An) such that, for all K, each player i Passes with probability 1 at least in the Þrst K − m nodes where he must move.
Proof. If
1 is an analogy-based expectation equilibrium outcome (this follows from the analysis in Proposition 3).
Otherwise, using the argument in the proof of Proposition 4, it is readily veriÞed that there is m such that for, K large enough, there is an equilibrium (σ, β) satisfying (1) β i (α main i ) = λ i,main ·P ass+(1−λ i,main )·T ake with λ i,main ≥ 1 2 for i = 1, 2, and (2) player i's best-response to β i is to Pass with probability 1 at least in the Þrst K − m moves.
(Finitely) Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
Consider the Prisoner's Dilemma P D whose matrix payoff is represented as:
Game P D with l i , g i > 0 for i = 1, 2, where each player i = 1, 2 has to choose simultaneously an action in {D, C}. We now consider several variants of repeated P D. The Þrst two variants illustrate how analogy reasoning may give rise to (non-trivial) end effects in the Þnitely repeated P D.
The third variant deals with the inÞnite repetition.
T-repetition:
We Þrst consider the T repetition of P D with no discount factor, and we denote by P D T the corresponding game tree. Nodes in P D T correspond to histories of length 0 to T specifying the action proÞles played in earlier periods (if any). The history of length 0 is denoted by ∅, and a history h of length t > 0 is (a (1) , ..., a (t) ) where
i ∈ {D, C} stands for the action played by player i in period k.
We consider the following analogy partitioning. Player 1 partitions the set of (2, h) into two classes: 31
Player 2 is assumed to use the Þnest partitioning of the set of (1, h). We refer to An as the corresponding partitioning, to N = {1, 2} as the set of players, and to % i as player i's preferences over outcomes in P D T (as induced by the above matrix function and the no discounting assumption).
Proposition 7
For T sufficiently large, the path (
is the equilibrium path of an analogy-based expectation equilibrium of (N, P D T , % i , An).
Proof. Suppose the proposed path corresponds to the analogy-based expectation equilibrium (σ, β). By consistency, one should have: 32
For T large enough (so that
T −1 is sufficiently close to 1), player 1's best-response σ 1 to β 1 is to play D in the last period T or 33 whenever one (or more) D has been played before. And to play C otherwise. 34 Player 2's best-response σ 2 to σ 1 is to play D whenever one (or more) D has been played before and in the last two periods T − 1 and T . And to play C otherwise. 35 The proof is completed by noting that the path generated by (σ 1 , σ 2 ) corresponds to the assumed path.
Remark 1: It is interesting to observe that in class α 1 (resp. α 0 1 ), Player 1 behaves in the same way in all histories h reached along the equilibrium path and such that (2, h) ∈ α 1 (resp. α 0 1 ). 31 History h = (a (1) , ..., a (t) ) is said to contain at least one D if there exist i = 1, 2 and k ≤ t such that 32 Note that the two analogy classes of player 1 are reached on this path. 33 Playing D in the last period T is optimal whatever the expectation (it is a dominant strategy). 34 To see this, consider (the worst case at) period T − 1 in which player 1 is supposed to play C. Stochastic T-repetition: We now consider a variant of P D T with T periods and no discounting, but such that in each period there is a draw by Nature to determine the value of each g i for the current period (the values of l i are assumed to remain constant throughout the game). To Þx ideas, we assume that the distributions are independent from period to period and accross players, and that in each period, g i takes value g with probability ν and g with probability ν where ν + ν = 1. 36 We denote by z (t) the joint draw of (g 1 , g 2 ) in period t, and we assume that players are risk neutral. We denote by P D s the associated game tree, and by % i player i's preferences.
Nodes in P D s correspond to histories of length 0 to T specifying the action proÞles played in earlier periods (if any) and the draws by Nature in all periods up to (and including) the current period. That is, the history of length 0 is z (1) specifying the draws g 1 and g 2 for the Þrst period. A history h of length t > 0 is ((a (1) , z (1) ); ...; (a (t) , z (t) ); z (t+1) ) where
∈ {D, C} stands for the action played by
Each player i partitions the set of (j, h) into two classes: 37
We deÞne u T = 1 + (ν · g + ν · g), and the sequence (u t ) t<T recursively by 38
We assume that u T < g and that no x t in this sequence is equal to g (which is satisÞed generically). We deÞne m as the integer such that u T −m+1 < g < u T −m . (Note that m is no larger than g, since u t − u t+1 > 1 as long as u t+1 < g.) 36 To keep in line with the class of games considered in Section 2, we assume that the draws of both g1 and g 2 are immediately revealed to both players. However, this is immaterial for the analysis below. 37 History h = ((a (1) , z (1) ); ...; (a (t) , z (t) ); z (t+1) ) is said to contain at least one D if there exist i = 1, 2 and
It is said to contain no D otherwise. 38 u t stands for the expected payoff of player i at date t − 1 when no C previously occurred and player i anticipates that (1) he will play D in the next period if gi = g (or if t = T ) and that (2) Proof. Given the assumed strategy proÞle σ and given that m is no larger than g, for T large enough, the analogy-based expectations β i hσi that is consistent with σ should satisfy:
It can be checked that the best-response to such a β i hσi is indeed σ i . 39 The logic of the equilibrium is as follows. Players rightly perceive that in class α 0 i , i.e. if some D was played earlier, only D can be expected next. In class α i , player j chooses C most of the time except toward reaching the end of the game: player i' expectation is thus close to Infinite repetition: We brießy consider the inÞnitely repeated prisoner's dilemma in which both players have the same discount factor δ, g 1 = g 2 = g > 0 and l 1 = l 2 = l > 0.
The associated game tree is denoted by P D δ , and player i's preference is denoted by % i .
As a preliminary comment, we Þrst observe that a cooperative outcome may emerge for some analogy partitioning, but not for others. We let α i denote player i's partitioning of (j, h) where h = (a (1) , ..., a (t) ) is a t-length history of action proÞles. 39 The sequence ut has been constructed precisely for that purpose. Suppose player i's partitioning An i bears only over the actions played by player j. That is, if h and h 0 involve the same sequence of actions of player i, (j, h) and (j, h 0 ) belong to the same analogy class. Then the only path that can be sustained as an analogy-based expectation equilibrium of (N, P D δ , % i , An) is the repetition of (D, D).
The point is that due to player i's partitioning, player i will play D irrespective of his expectation, since there is no effect identiÞed by player i of i's own actions on j's behavior.
As a result, only the repetition of (D, D) can emerge.
Of course, if each player i partitions the set of (j, h) according to
then the trigger strategy proÞle in which each player i plays C whenever no D was played so far and plays D otherwise is part of an analogy-based expectation equilibrium of (N, P D δ , % i , An). 41 In the above examples, it is readily veriÞed that the analogy-based expectation equilibria (σ, β) of (N, P D δ , % i , An) are such that σ is a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium of P D δ .
We now show that this need not be the case.
Example 2: Assume that 1 − l > 1 2 (1 + g). Player 2 uses the Þnest partitioning of (1, h). Player 1 partitions (2, h) into two classes:
DeÞne the following strategy proÞle σ: And deÞne player 1's analogy-based expectation β 1 as 42 :
Claim 2: For δ close enough to 1, (σ, β) is an analogy-based expectation equilibrium of (N, P D δ , % i , An). Yet, σ is not a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium of P D δ . 41 The associated analogy-based expectations are: βi(αi) = C and βi(α Proof. The path generated by σ (starting from the nul history) is an alternation of (C, C) and (C, D). Hence, the expression for β 1 (α 1 ). (β 1 (α 0 1 ) = D is the correct expectation.) It is readily veriÞed that σ 2 is a best-response to σ 1 . After an (D, C) occurs or player 2 played D in two consecutive periods, each player i's strategy requires playing D. Note that even player 1' expectation is correct in this case, and the requirements for equilibrium are satisÞed. In all other events and if the last action played by player 2 was C (resp. D), player 1 expects (given β 1 and the ensuing strategy σ 1 ) to get u C (resp. u D ) by playing C where
(As δ gets close to 1, u D ≈ (−l + 1) and u C ≈ 2(−l + 1).) If player 1 plays D instead of C when the last action of player 2 is C (resp. D), player 1 expects to get
(1 + g), player 1 prefers playing C in both cases. The strategy proÞle σ is not a SPNE because player 1 should optimally prefer playing D rather than C on the equilibrium path when the last action proÞle is (C, C).
The effect of player 1's treatment by analogy here is to allow to sustain strategy proÞles in which player 1 is not punished after every deviation player 1 may consider. (In the above example, player 1 is not punished if he plays D instead of C when player 2 is supposed to play D.) Player 1 conforms to the prescribed strategy because he perceives an average punishment in case of deviation (even if in some events there would be no actual punishment).
Bargaining and ultimatum games
In this subsection we wish to illustrate the effect of analogy reasoning in situations where the action spaces are large at least in some nodes. A simple example is provided by the following Take-it-or-Leave-it model. There are two players i = 1, 2 and a pie of size 1. Player 1 makes a partition offer (x, 1 − x), x ∈ [0, 1] to player 2 who may either accept or reject it. 43 If he accepts, players 1 and 2 get x and 1 − x, respectively. If player 2 rejects the offer, player 1 gets 0 and player 2 gets an outside option payoff equal to v out , where 0 < v out < 1. Call N = {1, 2} the set of players, % i player i's preferences, and T L the game tree associated with the above setup. 43 The action space of player 1 in this example is continuous (which is not covered by the framework of Section 2). The analysis presented below can be viewed as corresponding to the limit of the Þnite grid case as the grid becomes Þner and Þner. (Alternatively, one can easily extend the deÞnitions of consistency and of analogy-based expectation equilibrium for this speciÞc example.)
Standard analysis suggests that player 1 will propose (1 − v out , v out ) and that player 2 will accept it. When player 1 forms his expectation about player 2's probability of acceptance by analogy, we now show that it may well be that either player 1 makes a much more generous offer than v out to player 2 or that player 1 makes an offer that is rejected by player 2 depending on the partitioning.
SpeciÞcally, a node in T L at which player 2 must move can be identiÞed with x where (x, 1 − x) is the offer made by player 1. We assume that player 1 partitions the set of (2, x) into two classes: 44
) corresponds to the class of outrageous (resp. generous) offers.
Proposition 9 (1) When 1 − x < v out , any analogy-based expectation equilibrium is such that there is no agreement: player 1 gets 0, player 2 gets v out . (2) When v out < 1 − x, there is a unique analogy-based expectation equilibrium in which player 1 proposes (x, 1 − x), which is accepted by player 2.
Proof. The analogy-based expectation of player 1 is of the form β 1 (α r 1 ) = λ r ·'Accepts'+(1 − λ r )·'Rejects' with r = low, high. If λ high > 0 (resp. λ low > 0), player 1's best-response to β 1 cannot be to offer (x, 1 − x) with x < x (resp. x < 1). (1) When 1 − x < v out , neither (1, 0) nor (x, 1 − x) are acceptable by player 2. Only a disagreement can occur. (2) When v out < 1 − x, λ high = 1, λ low = 0, player 1 proposing (x, 1 − x) and player 2 accepting any offer (x, 1 − x) with 1 − x ≥ v out gives rise to an analogy-based expectation equilibrium. It is also immediate to check that there is no other analogy-based expectation equilibrium.
Comment 1: The analysis of Proposition 9 is pretty similar to the one that would arise if player 1 could only propose a partition offer in {(x, 1 − x), (1, 0)}. Thus the analogy reasoning here has the effect (through the working of the best-response correspondence) of reducing the offers considered by player 1 in equilibrium.
Comment 2: Another setup which would give similar insights is one in which the responder would not distinguish within the set of high offers (i.e., offers x such that x ≤ x) nor within the set of low offers (i.e., offers x such that x > x). 45 However, in a slightly more elaborate model in which player 1 could not pick a deterministic offer, but could only affect 44 The intervals are closed as indicated to guarantee the existence of an equilibrium. 45 See Dow (1991), Meyer (1991) and Rubinstein (1993) for investigations of coarse informational partitionings of this sort.
the distribution of offers received by player 2, then the two approaches would have different behavioral implications. 46 To give a further illustration of the effect of analogy reasoning in this kind of contexts, consider the following bargaining game (see Rubinstein 1982 ). There are two players i = 1, 2 and a pie of size 1. Players alternate in making offers. Player 1 starts, and makes an offer
) to player 1 and so on. Players are assumed to discount future payoffs according to the same discount factor δ. Call N = {1, 2} the set of players, % i player i's preferences, and R the game tree.
Standard analysis suggests that player 1 will propose ( 1 1+δ , δ 1+δ ) and that player 2 will accept it immediately. We now show that when players reason by analogy, an agreement need not be reached immediately resulting in severe efficiency losses.
Nodes in which player 1 (resp. 2) must move are of two types: nodes in which player 1 (resp. 2) must make an offer -we refer to such nodes as h of f 1 (resp. h of f 2 )-, and nodes h resp 1 (resp. h resp 2 ) in which player 1 (resp. 2) must respond to an offer (1 − x 2 , x 2 ) (resp. (x 1 , 1− x 1 )). We assume that each player i uses three classes to categorize the nodes at which player j must move:
One can show: 47
Proposition 10 Suppose that x 1 + x 2 > 1 and let δ be sufficiently close to 1. The following assessment (σ, β) is an analogy-based expectation equilibrium of (N, R, % i , An). Player i's strategy: Propose x i for himself (and 1 − x i for player j), Accept with probability p i the offer 1 − x j of player j, Reject (Accept) any offer strictly below (above) 1 − x i . Player i's 46 For the sake of illustration, suppose player 1 chooses x (as in the main presentation). When player 1 chooses x, player 2 receives the offer (x, 1 − x) with a large probability, but also any offer (y, 1 − y) with y > x with a small probability. We assume the same partitioning (regarding the offer effectively received by player 2) as in the main text and 1 − x < v out . When the responder has a coarse perception, he will reject any offer (y, 1 − y), y ≤ x, whereas in the analogy setup he will accept offers (y, 1 − y) whenever 1 − y > v out . Hence, the non equivalence: in the analogy setup, player 1 will pick x, and sometimes with small probability the deal will be accepted; in the coarse perception setup, there will never be any agreement. 47 The probability pi is determined so that player j is indifferent between accepting 1 − xi today and having his offer of 1 − x j accepted with probability p i tomorrow (and otherwise accepting 1 − x j aftertomorrow).
expectation: i , k = 1, ...K he currently is (whereas players no longer form their expectations by analogy). For K large enough, an equilibrium in this setting is that each player i Passes with probability 1 in his unique memory/information set
48 The insight we get here is similar to the one that would arise if each player i could only propose 1 − xi to player j. There is some parallel with the effect of Þnite grids in bargaining as analyzed in van Damme-SeltenWinter (1990) (who focus on the multiplicity issue). However, the grid resulting from the analogy partitioning need not be the same for the two players (nor need it be Þne, as considered by these authors). Also, the analogy treatment forces here stationarity in the form of the equilibrium, which is not implied by the Þnite grid treatment. 49 One can argue that games with imperfect recall fall in the class of games with incomplete information (see the discussion in Piccione-Rubinstein 1997) . 50 The point is that player i cannot adjust the best time for Taking, as he does not know in which N Imperfect recall explains in this case why players may Pass all the time in the centipede game. However, it does so by assuming that players do not perceive that there is an end (since players are assumed not to know at which node they currently are). In the analogy approach developed in subsection 3.2, players do know at which node they currently are. They Pass initially because they do not have an accurate expectation about when their opponent will Take (they only have an expectation about the average behavior of their opponent all over the game). Also, players do perceive that there is an end, as they consider Taking Here is a problem though with this interpretation: Suppose that in equilibrium both (j, h) and (j, h 0 ) in α i are reached with positive probability. And that player j does not behave in the same way in h and h 0 . In principle, player i could check ex post (or statistically after many plays of the game) that player j does not behave in the same way in h and h 0 , violating i's premise that h and h 0 are in the same information set of j. Would player i continue to hold such a belief about player j's information structure in such a case? 53
Remark: With this interpretation, if one adds the requirement that player j should behave in the same way in all nodes h and h 0 reached in equilibrium and such that (j, h) and (j, h 0 ) belong to the same α i , then the play must correspond to that of a self-conÞrming equilibrium (which need not be the case in general with the analogy-based expectation equilibrium). 54 51 I would like to thank a referee for suggesting the following interpretation. 52 With this interpretation, it seems odd to pool together (j, h) and (j 0 , h 0 ) with j 6 = j 0 as the general setup of Section 2 allows it, hence the restriction to two-player games. 53 If player i does not even think of checking whether player j behaves (statistically) in the same way in h and h 0 , the proposed concept seems to make sense, but the interpretation then gets closer to that of analogy reasoning in that player i is satisÞed with a partial expectation about player j's behavior. 54 The only self-conÞrming equilibrium in the centipede game CP K requires player 1 Taking in the Þrst node (and see the analysis in subsection 3.2).
Two principles on analogy partitioning
No structure was imposed so far on the analogy categorization. Understanding how individuals categorize contingencies to form their expectations is clearly beyond the scope of this paper (it is at the heart of a large body of the ongoing research of cognitive scientists, see
Holyoak-Thagard 1995 and Dunbar 2000, for example). As a modest game-theoretic investigation, we now review two principles (for analogy partitionings) that may alternatively be viewed as attempts to reÞne the concept of analogy-based expectation equilibrium.
Analogy expectation and similar play:
An appealing idea seems to be that in order for player i to pool several nodes (j, h) into a single class of analogy, player i should himself consider playing in the same way in some pool of nodes. One difficulty is that in general player i need not move in the same nodes as player j, and therefore one should also worry about which nodes h 0 ∈ H i player i considers as being similar to nodes h ∈ H j .
A class of situations in which this issue can be addressed simply is one in which whenever player i bundles two elements (j, h) and (j 0 , h 0 ) into the same analogy class α i , player i also has to move in h and h 0 . And player i plays the same behavioral strategy at nodes h and h 0 .
We distinguish according to whether this property should be met only for histories reached along the played path or for all histories. 55
In the Þnitely repeated prisoner's dilemma P D T in which player 1 uses two classes of analogy α 1 , α 0 1 , (according to whether or not at least one D was played earlier) and player 2 uses the Þnest partition, we observed (see Remark 1 after Proposition 7) that for all histories h met along the played path, whenever (2, h) ∈ α 1 (resp. α 0 1 ), player 1 plays the same action C (resp. D) at node h. Thus, the property is met for all histories h reached along the played path. 56 The next example is such that the property is met for all histories (whether on or off the equilibrium path), and yet the play differs from that of the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium:
Example 3: Consider the following two-stage two-player game. Player 1 moves Þrst and chooses between the normal form game G or G 0 . In both G and G 0 , players 1 and 2 move simultaneously, and in both G and G 0 , player 1 chooses in A 1 = {U, D}, player 2 chooses in {L, R}. We assume that U is a dominant strategy in both G and G 0 for player 1. Player 2's best-response to U is R in game G, whereas it is L in game G 0 . Finally, we assume that 55 One might argue that a player is more likely to have doubts about his analogy partitioning if the property is violated on the equilibrium path histories. 56 The requirement is not met though for the off the equilibrium path history h = (a (t) ) player 1 derives a higher payoff when (U, R) is played in game G than when (U, L) is played in game G 0 . And that player 1 derives a higher payoff when (U, L) is played in game G 0 than when (U, L) is played in game G.
The unique Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium is such that player 1 chooses game G and then (U, R) occurs (this yields player 1 more than (U, L) in G 0 ).
Suppose that player 1 puts in the same analogy class (2, G) and (2, G 0 ) in order to predict player 2's behavior. Note Þrst that player 1 behaves in the same way in G and G 0 (he has the same dominant strategy in both games). Thus, the required property is satisÞed. Second, it is readily veriÞed that an equilibrium outcome in this analogy setting is that player 1 chooses G 0 (expecting player 2 to play L in both G and G 0 ), since player 1 prefers (U, L) in game G 0 rather than (U, L) in game G.
All analogy classes must be reached:
Another property that may be of interest is that players structure their analogy classes so that each analogy class is reached with positive probability in equilibrium. 57 The next Proposition provides some insight about the effect of this principle in the centipede game
Proposition 11 Let (σ, β) be an analogy-based expectation equilibrium of (N, CP K , % i , An)
where N = {1, 2} denotes the set of players, % i player i's preferences, and An the partitioning proÞle used by the players. Suppose that for all k, 
is not reached in equilibrium and since all 57 A possible psychological rationale for this is that players tend to prefer structuring analogy classes so that expectations can be checked on the equilibrium path (without trembling requirement).
analogy classes must be reached with positive probability, it must be that there is an analogy
with k 00 > k 0 are not reached). 58 Since at any node N (k 00 ) j with k 00 < k 0 player j Passes with probability 1 (remember that Take at node N (k) i is the assumed outcome), it must be that the analogy-based expectation of player i satisÞes
But given this expectation (and given that for all k,
cannot be a best-response to β i (at node N (k) i , player i should strictly prefer Passing rather than Taking). This leads to a contradiction.
Multiplicity and Analogy-Based Expectation Equilibrium
In this subsection we would like to highlight the implication of analogy reasoning on the multiplicity of equilibria. A Þrst observation is that the analogy treatment may sometimes kill the multiplicity of equilibria that would otherwise prevail. For example, in the inÞnitely repeated prisoner's dilemma P D δ , we observed that if one player has an analogy partitioning such that his own actions play no role, then the only equilibrium outcome is the repetition of (D, D). Here, the analogy treatment kills the multiplicity because it does not permit enough conditioning of players' expectations.
A second observation is that the analogy treatment may sometimes create a multiplicity of equilibria by permitting some form of conditioning that would not be possible otherwise.
For example, in the Þnitely repeated prisoner's dilemma in which player 1 uses two classes according to whether or not at least one D was played earlier and player 2 uses the Þnest partitioning, we saw an equilibrium in which both players play C except in the last two periods (see subsection 3.3.). But, there is also an equilibrium for this partitioning in which both players play D in every period. Here, the multiplicity arises because the analogy treatment permits a conditioning of player 1's expectation (upon whether or not at least one D was played earlier) that would not be possible otherwise (due to the logic of backward induction).
A third observation is that the consistency condition (1) implies non-linearities, thus creating a potential for multiple equilibria, even when players use a single class of analogy 59 and there is a unique equilibrium in the setup without analogy. For example, in the centipede game CP K in which both players use the coarsest partition and condition (4) holds, we saw that there are two pure strategy analogy-based expectation equilibria (see Proposition 3).
58 There exists at least one such node because (i, k) 6 = (1, 1). 59 Hence, no conditioning of the type just mentioned is at work.
Related literature
There are very few approaches to analogy in economics. These include the axiomatic approaches of Rubinstein (1988) and Gilboa-Schmeidler (1994) about similarity and case-based decision theory, respectively (which derive representation theorems for decision processes satisfying a number of axioms). These also include the automata theory developed for game theory by Rubinstein (1986) , and Abreu-Rubinstein (1988) (see also Samuelson 2000 for a recent contribution with an explicit reference to the analogy interpretation). In the automaton setup, two different histories 60 h and h 0 may induce the same state of player i's machine, and thus the same action of player i; Player i then acts in an analogous way in h and h 0 . It should be noted that none of the above approaches considers the treatment of expectations (as opposed to behaviors) by analogy.
I now discuss a few alternative approaches to bounded rationality and how they relate to (differ from) the analogy-based expectation approach. By bounded rationality, I mean here that either players fail to optimize their true payoffs given their expectations (failure of instrumental rationality) or players fail to have correct expectations (failure of cognitive rationality) or players have a wrong perception about the game being played. Clearly, the analogy-based expectation equilibrium approach challenges the cognitive rationality, but not the other two features of rationality.
In his discussion of small words, Savage (1954) suggests the possibility that a decision maker may not be able to envision the whole complexity of the state space when making a decision. 61 In the analogy-based expectation approach too, players form expectations about the behavior of others by simplifying the node space over which other players must move.
One can view the present paper as an attempt to incorporate Savage's small word idea into a game theoretic context. 62 Simon (see, for example, Simon 1955) is clearly one of the leaders in emphasizing the need to incorporate bounded rationality into economics. One of his main concerns is that the process of decision making be manageable in particular with respect to information gathering.
The analogy treatment proposed in this paper shares with this view the worry to ensure that These approaches assume that players fail to optimize exactly (either they optimize up to ε in Radner or they play any strategy with positive probability in McKelvey-Palfrey), but expectations about what other players might do are assumed to be accurate (in every contingency). Thus these approaches challenge the cognitive rationality, but not the other forms of rationality. 64
Studies of limited foresight in multi-stage games (see Jehiel 1995 Jehiel -1998 Jehiel -2001 ) also challenge the cognitive rationality assumption in that players are assumed to form predictions only about a truncated future. However, the form of limitation imposed by limited foresight is substantially different from that imposed by analogy reasoning. 65
In the context of normal form games, Osborne-Rubinstein (1998) model situations in which players behave as if they were not in a strategic environment. Players experiment each possible action once (or several times), and choose the action that delivered the highest payoff. This approach (at least with this interpretation) as well as that of Greenberg (1996) challenges the view that players have a correct perception of the game being played (see also Camerer 1998 for an experimental account of misperceptions of games).
Finally, other approaches to the Þnite horizon paradoxes include the crazy type approach , the ε-equilibrium (Radner), the quantal response equilibrium (McKelveyPalfrey), the lack of common knowledge of the termination date (Neyman 1986 ), the justiÞability approach (Spiegler 2000) . 66 The ε-equilibrium and quantal response equilibrium approaches were already discussed. None of the other approaches rely on a form of bounded rationality as deÞned above.
63 Also, Simon does not emphasize the implications of his approach in strategic environments with several decision makers interacting at the same time.
64 See also Tesfatsion (1984) for another example of this sort. 65 For example, limited foresight alone is incapable of explaining that players may Pass in the centipede game. In the precursor of this paper (Jehiel 1999) , I combined limited foresight and the analogy idea to analyze the centipede game. 66 In the Þnitely repeated prisoners' dilemma, Benoit develops a non-equibrium approach in which expectations about the other player's strategy may be arbitrary. Since no constraint of any sort is placed on these expectations, his approach seems hard to generalize.
